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Abstract
Certificate authorities (CAs) are the main components of PKI that enable us for providing basic security services in
wired networks and Internet. But, we cannot use centralized CAs, in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). So, many
efforts have been made to adapt CA to the special characteristics of MANETs and new concepts such as
distributed CAs (DCAs) have been proposed that distribute the functionality of CA between MANET nodes. In this
article, we study various proposed DCA schemes for MANET and then classify these schemes according to their
internal structures and techniques. Finally, we propose the characteristics of an ideal DCA system that can be used
to verify the completeness of any DCA scheme. This classification and taxonomy identify the weakness and
constraints of each scheme, and are very important for designing more secure, scalable, and high performance
DCA systems for MANETs and other networks.
Keywords: distributed certificate authority, threshold cryptography, registration authority (RA), PDCA, CA nodes,
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1.Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a set of mobile
devices that are connected through wireless links. MAN-
ETs have characteristics such as limited bandwidth,
absence of any fixed central structure, and ever chan-
ging topologies. Thus, implementing strong security ser-
vices in such environments is very hard and MANETs
are highly vulnerable to various security attacks. To
solve security problems, public key cryptography must
be used in MANETs without incurring heavy network
traffic. One of the main components of PKI infrastruc-
ture is a certificate authority (CA), it is a trusted third
party used for issuing, revoking, and managing of user
certificates. Unfortunately, the CA itself can be attacked
and finally compromised; in this case, the intruder can
sign certificates using the CAs private key.
The simplest approach to implement a CA is to assign
CA task to single node. One of the main problems of this
approach is its availability and it can bring the entire
MANET to a halt if it moves out of the MANET.
Furthermore, it acts as a single point of failure if it is com-
promised by an attacker. A replicated CAs can be used to
solve availability problem of previous scheme [1]. There-
fore, using x replica, the system can withstand (x - 1) fail-
ures because the CA service is available as long as there is
at least one operational CA. But, this approach creates
consistency problems when CA nodes cannot find each
others. Also, if any CA node is compromised, we will have
several points of compromise in MANET. To solve all of
these problems, we must use distributed certificate author-
ity (DCA). The rest of the article is organized as follows: In
Section 2, DCAs in MANET are discussed. In Section 3,
the threshold cryptography is described and in Section 4,
we classify and compare various proposed DCA schemes.
At last, in Section 5, we present the properties of an ideal
DCA system for MANET.
2. Distributed CA
A DCA is realized through the distribution of the CA’s
private key to a number of shareholding DCA nodes.
However, the public key of the DCA will be known by
all network’s nodes and will be used to verify signatures
of certificates issued by the DCA. When operations such
as issuing or revoking certificates are required, a
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threshold of available shareholding DCA nodes should
participate [2]. In Table 1, we compare the properties of
centralized (none replicated) CA with distributed CA
systems. It shows that although distribution increases
reliability and availability, it decreases the security of
system.
Zhou et al. [3] present a fault-tolerant and secure
online certification authority system for local area net-
work and internet, called COCA which cannot be used
in MANET environment.
The DCA approach has also been proposed in Wire-
less Mesh and Vehicular Networks and a number of
schemes have been devised for these. Since a little work
has been done in Wireless Mesh Networks, only one
scheme has been proposed. In MANET, many DCAs
schemes have been designed and they can be classified
as partially or fully distributed certificate authorities
(FDCA). In partially implemented DCA (PDCA), ser-
vices of the CA are distributed to a set of specialized
server nodes using secret sharing. Each of these nodes
can generate partial certificates and a client can create a
valid certificate by combining enough number of these
partial certificates. In this case, these special server
nodes must have high energy and the inherent heteroge-
neity of the nodes in network is utilized to choose the
candidates for CA nodes. However, if all the nodes in
MANET were identical, the nodes of the distributed CA
might be chosen randomly.
One of the advantages of PDCA is its practicality and
generality. It has some disadvantages as follow:
• Availability problem:
The most important risk of PDCA is the network
partitioning. Therefore, if a threshold number of
DCA nodes are not available in the network seg-
ments, we will have availability problem.
• Performance problem:
Server nodes may be scattered all around the net-
work and may be many hops away. Therefore, com-
munication delay will be increased proportional to
the number of hopes between client and the server
nodes.
• Number of server nodes:
Selecting the right number of nodes for PDCA is not
an easy task and we cannot specify the exact number
of them. They should be a function of the network
size, the degree of resilience required against attacks
and number of operations that DCA supports. It is
obvious that choosing small number of server nodes
for DCA causes bottleneck and creates performance
problems.
In FDCA, services of a CA are distributed to all nodes
and using secret sharing, each of these nodes can gener-
ate partial certificates [4]. FDCA reduces the communi-
cation delay and improves the availability because
almost all the neighbors of a requesting node hold
shares of the DCA’s private signature key. However, it
allows attackers break the system more easily and when
an intruder enters the network and compromises one or
more nodes, he becomes as good as a valid one. To
overcome this problem, an intrusion detection system is
required to be presented in the network, which can
identify the misbehaving or compromised nodes, and
remove them from the network. In some schemes such
as [5], certificates have limited lifetime and after expira-
tion time they are revoked. Thus, compromised keys
cannot be used anymore. The amount of this expiration
time will be a tradeoff between security and
performance.
Regarding the large amount of expiration time, secur-
ity weakens and with the small amount of expiration
times, certificates must be frequently renewed, so this
may produce performance problems, because large
amount of data must be transferred between DCAs and
client nodes. To solve performance problems, the
expiration time of well-behaved nodes can be increased.
In Table 2, we have compared the properties of PDCA
and FDCA. In all FDCA and PDCA schemes, the com-
munication pattern between a client and DCA nodes is
one-to-many and many-to-one, which means that a cli-
ent needs to contact at least k CA nodes and receive at
least k replies. The simplest form of communication
between clients and CA nodes is flooding. Although this
Table 1 Comparison of centralized CA and distributed CA
Centralized CA Distributed CA
Security High Low
Availability Low High
Fault tolerance Low High
Messaging overhead Low High
Performance High Low
Message exchange Low High
Scalability High Low
Routing dependent No Some schemes
Special nodes Required Only PDCA
User nodes mobility High Some scheme
DCA nodes mobility Low High
Revocation source Owner issuer Owner, issuer, k
accusation





K Request, K Reply
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approach is effective, it generates a large amount of traf-
fic. Furthermore, it is possible that more than k, CA
node receive the certificate request and respond to it;
so, a client receives more responses than it needs. Since,
almost all of DCA schemes use threshold cryptography
we must describe it prior to examining the proposed
schemes in detail.
In Figure 1, we have classified all CAs from distribu-
tion perspective and it helps us to understand the
degree of distribution in each kind of CA.
In this article, Table 3 lists the abbreviations used for
DCA systems.
3. Threshold cryptography
In threshold cryptography, operations like the genera-
tion of digital signatures are divided among network
nodes, so that the action can be done if at least a certain
number of parties collaborate. It tolerates the crashes of
some components, for example, a (t - 1,n) threshold sig-
nature allows, in a group of a total of n parties, any t
parties sign jointly, but no coalition of up to t - 1 parties
can. Any service provided by CA is performed jointly by
t (t ≥ 2) CA nodes, where t is called the threshold of
the secret sharing. In this way, even if an attacker has
discovered the secret shares of some but less than t CA
nodes, the attacker still cannot recover CA’s secret key.
However, the above threshold secret sharing scheme
still fails when the shares of more than t, CA nodes
have been discovered by the intruders over a sufficiently
long period. To enhance security, secret share update
has been proposed, in which a new set of shares are
computed after a certain time interval. Therefore, an
attacker has to complete the attack within this interval
[6]. However, distributing CA on a number of nodes
provides some problems:
• First, a user node has to find t, CA server nodes in
MANET that is more difficult to find than finding
one CA node. Schemes such as flooding for finding
CA will not work since they consume too much net-
work resource.
• Second, although efficient update of the secret
shares in all CA nodes is not trivial, some schemes
have been proposed.
• Third, it is difficult to select right set of nodes to
collectively provide the CA services.
• Fourth, it is difficult to provide efficient communi-
cation between the mobile nodes and the CA nodes,
even in dynamic networks with possible compro-
mises or temporary network partitions [7].
In (k, n) threshold cryptography, k can be chosen
between 1 (a single CA for network) and n (FDCA). Set-
ting k to a higher value has the effect of making the sys-
tem more secure against possible adversaries. But, a
higher k value can cause more communication overhead.
Thus, the threshold k should be chosen to balance the
two conflicting requirements. It is clear that no value
will fit all systems, so some approaches such as MOCA
provide guidelines for choosing the right value for k.
Threshold cryptography is vulnerable to Sybil attacks,
thus some schemes have been presented to solve this
Table 2 Comparison of PDCA and FDCA
PDCA FDCA
Client to DCA communication One-to-many One-to-many
DCA to client communication Many to one Many to one
Security Higher than FDCA Low
Availability Lower than FDCA High
Fault tolerance Lower than FDCA High
Mobility support Low High
Secret update Multicast Broadcast
Client distance from DCA One hop or more One hop
Network size Large networks Small networks
Scalability High Low
Special nodes Required Not Required
IDS or additional monitoring Not required Required
Figure 1 The spectrum of distribution in CAs.




CCA Centralized certificate authority
DCA Distributed certificate authority
PDCA Partially distributed certificate authority




OCSP Online certificate status protocol
CRL Certificate revocation lists
CH Cluster head
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problem. Finally, with any threshold cryptography-based
DCA we will have these parameters:
• Total number of nodes in the network (M).
• The number of nodes deputed with CA responsi-
bility (n).
• The minimum number of nodes for signature con-
struction (k).
3.1. Proactive secret sharing
Having enough time, an attacker could compromise k
shareholders and this allows him to reconstruct the
secret. To defend against such attackers, proactive
secret sharing scheme updates the shares periodically,
without changing the associated private key of DCA.
It can be performed more than refreshing the private
key. So, an attacker must compromise k shareholders
between the updates. Because shares before and after
the refresh operation have no relation and if one
share is leaked, it will become useless after the
refresh. Determining the periods of private key and
key shares’ updates is very important and has direct
impact on the security and performance of the DCA.
Thus, if we choose too long values for these periods,
the performance of DCA increases, but the security
decreases. Also, if we choose short values for these
periods, we may have performance problems. Many
messages must be sent for these updates so the secur-
ity increases and keys change sooner than an attacker
can find them. As a result, update periods are func-
tions of performance, security, and the situations of
MANET.
4. Classification and taxonomy
In this section, we classify the various proposed PDCA
and FDCA schemes into six categories. Two of these
categories use existing MANET infrastructure and
protocols:
• Cluster-based DCAs:
These schemes achieve greater scalability and provide
better performance. Also some of them support mobility
of DCA nodes.
• Routing-based DCAs:
These schemes depend on the special multicast or
unicast (proactive or reactive) routing protocols for intra
DCA or node to DCA communications.
Although, some of the presented schemes do not
depend on any MANET components, they try to solve
some of the DCA problems in MANET. These schemes
are as follows:
• Self-initialized schemes
• Mobility aware schemes
• Security-based schemes
• Performance and availability-based schemes
In Figure 2, we have classified all of the CA schemes
that are proposed for various networks. This taxonomy
is very helpful to find out the networks in which DCA
systems are used and the techniques that DCA applies.
4.1. Cluster-based DCA
Flat ad hoc networks have poor scalability and the
throughput of these networks will decline rapidly with
the increase of network nodes. The solution for this
problem is clustering. The use of clustering in DCAs has
two advantages. First, it reduces the storage require-
ments of individual node, as each node needs to store at
most the certificates of the other nodes in the same
cluster rather than the entire network.
Second, it reduces the communication overhead and
increases the efficiency of certificate management, as
certificates are always available to each node at a local
repository, few hops away.
Chaddoud et al. [2] proposed a DCA for near-term
digital radio (NTDR) cluster-based ad hoc networks.
The DCA is distributed among the cluster heads (CHs)
which become the shareholding DCA nodes. Thus, no
single CH knows the DCA private key and when a new
CH joins the backbone it needs to be issued with a
share of the DCA’s private key. In this scheme, when a
node wants the DCA to sign a request, the node’s CH
receives the request and forwards it to the backbone.
Any CH that receives the request uses his share of
shared key to sign the request and produces a signature
share. Once the node has received and verified k signa-
ture shares it can use them to construct the DCA’s sig-
nature on request. This DCA supports the operations
such as system setup or bootstrapping, applying a DCA
private key, joining a new CH, evicting an existing CH,
refreshing CH shares. In Bootstrapping operation, to
construct the shared key and establish a (k,n) threshold
sharing of a private key, all CHs must participate with
the Distributed Key Generation algorithm as part of the
construction of the NTDR backbone.
Rao and Xie [8] present another distributed certifica-
tion authority scheme based on clustering scheme. They
classify MANET nodes into clients, repositories, and
server nodes. The client nodes are organized into clus-
ters. In each cluster, some nodes are elected to be repo-
sitory which stores the certificates of the nodes and
servers within the cluster. The server nodes are elected
in repository nodes. Because authentication is one of the
key vulnerabilities of CA systems, they use a registration
authority (RA). When a new node joins the network, it
contacts a fixed RA. Then RA verifies credential of new
node and contacts k server nodes. In addition, they issue
certificate for new node and sent it to RA. Considering
next step, RA gives this certificate to new node. Unfor-
tunately, they have assumed that the RA does not
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belong to ad hoc network and it is part of a wired net-
work. To design various components of ad hoc network,
we should preserve the independence of MANET and
do not depend on any other networks’ components.
Certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are the other issues
that have been discussed in this approach. Revoking a
certificate can be initiated either by few nodes belonging
to the same cluster or by a node that wants to revoke
its own certificate. Furthermore, they have considered
the mobility of nodes among clusters of MANET, some-
thing that almost never discussed in other schemes.
When a mobile node leaves the source cluster and
enters the destination cluster, it contacts any repository
at destination cluster. At the same time, the mobile
node sends its own certificate to the repository of desti-
nation cluster. The certificates of the node in the source
cluster can be removed, unless the mobility manage-
ment protocol predicts that the node is temporarily
moved to a new cluster.
Elhdhili et al. [9] propose a totally distributed cluster-
based key management for ad hoc networks and use a
(K,N) threshold scheme to distribute an RSA signing
key to the set of CHs, Furthermore, they use proactive
and verifiable secret sharing to protect the secret from
various attacks. They also assume that the system con-
tains three types of nodes. The first one is an adminis-
trator that will exist only when the initialization step
can leave the network. The second nodes are a set of
CHs and the third ones are regular nodes. In addition,
the administrator and CHs have directories to save the
certificates. Each CH is a central CA for its cluster
members. It is initialized by the administrator or by a
coalition of K, other CHs. For system bootstrapping,
administrator plays the role of a certification authority
for CHs and then he can leave. Its main role is to certify
existing CHs, distribute his secret key over them accord-
ing to the secret sharing scheme and give them his cer-
tificate. The CHs will be considered as a distributed
certification authority for the new nodes. In Figure 3,
we have specified the advantages of clustering in DCA
systems and the functions that CH can do on behalf of
other users.
Dong et al. [6] have designed another cluster-based
PDCA for MANET and propose optimization for DCA’s
nodes operations. First, when a user needs PDCA ser-
vices, he must locate enough PDCA server nodes. To
solve this problem, they shift the responsibility of CA
discovery from user nodes to the CHs. Thus, a CH
must maintain the required information to locate the
CA nodes in or out of its cluster. Therefore, each CH
maintains a CA information table (CIT), which contains
a list of the CA nodes in its local cluster, and probably
the CA information in other clusters. When a user
requests DCA services, he sends it to his CH to obtain
the required CA information through which the CA ser-
vers can quickly be located. In this way, DCA informa-
tion is managed only among the CHs, which reduces
the response time and overhead of various DCA opera-
tions and enhance the availability and response time of
the system. Second, to increase the security of DCA,
each node’s share must be updated regularly, so the effi-
cient updating of this secret shares in all CA server
nodes is very important and has direct impact on DCA’s
performance. In this approach, they have devised a dis-
tributed scheme called sequential share update, to
reduce the update overhead. It can resolve the multiple
Figure 2 Taxonomy and classification of CA systems.
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initializations problem and achieves fast system-wide
update with low system overhead. At the beginning of
sequential update, a coalition of t servers, instead of all
servers, update their shares by applying the traditional
proactive share update scheme. The remaining nodes
will implement the self-initialization protocol so they
can refresh their secret share with the help of t servers
who have already updated their shares. Finally, although
they have devised good solutions to increase availability
and performance of DCA, they did not propose anything
about RA in their scheme and just assume when a user
first joins the network, he has been authenticated.
Lee and Jeong [10] proposed a partially distributed
certificate management system that can handle mobility
of nodes. It minimizes routing loads and enhances
expandability of network by allowing participating nodes
to authenticate each other without being interrupted by
joining the cluster. In their model, certificate creation
time slightly rose as the number of bits increased. But,
the pace of increase was much slower than that
obtained from the use of existing certificate-based
authentication protocol. In addition, the proposed
model offered a steady delivery time in the certificate
creation phase despite the increase in packet size. The
efficiency and security can be therefore maintained in
the network. It was also found that the efficiency of the
network was not influenced by changes in the number
of nodes (k) because partial certificates are consistently
generated by coalition of existing member nodes with-
out being interfered by nodes joining the cluster. Since
the node requesting partially distributed certificates per-
forms the whole process involving certificate creation,
unnecessary system overhead can be eliminated.
Zouridaki et al. [11] designed an elliptic curve-based
DCA system. Elliptic curve is used because of its shorter
key length and lower computational overhead. Their
scheme uses a three-tiered logical view of DCA architec-
ture. At the lowest tier, individual nodes are organized
into clusters. The next tier consists of one or more cer-
tificate repositories in each cluster that broadcast the
certificates of new nodes and the top tier consists of
DCA servers that periodically inform the cluster about
issued or the updated CRL. In general, the inter-cluster
communication depends on whether it needs to be
authenticated or encrypted, but the communication
inside a cluster is relatively fast. Because each node
caches the most used certificates and updated CRLs of
the nodes within the cluster and infrequently communi-
cates with the repositories. In this scheme, the number
of servers is defined by n = 2k + 1 and it tolerates k
compromised server in a predefined period of time. In
Table 4, we have compared the various properties of all
cluster-based DCA schemes.
4.2. Routing-based DCA
Even though flooding the messages in the network is the
easiest way to transfer the certificate requests and other
messages, it degrades the performance of MANET, so
unicast protocols have been used in most of the DCA
schemes to solve this problem. In MANETs, unicast
routing protocols are classified into proactive, reactive,
and hybrid protocols. With the large amount of control
data that proactive routing protocols send, it seems that
they can be used for implementing DCA in MANET.
So, Dhillon et al. [5] propose an FDCA to be implemen-
ted with OLSR protocol. This approach uses existing
OLSR control packets. It enables MANET to autono-
mously self-secure itself without any external adminis-
tration and minimizes the signaling overhead. It is
assumed that the network is initialized with at least k
shareholders and a certificate-requesting node must dis-
cover them. Each MPR uses its TC message to
announce which nodes in its MPR selector set claim to
be shareholders. When a node receives TC messages, it
uses them to build routing and shareholder tables. A
node chooses a serving coalition of the k least costly
shareholders in terms of hop count and sends a CREQ
message to these nodes. Upon receiving this message,
each node generates a certificate and returns it in a
CREPLY message. The requesting node verifies the
validity of the partial signature using verifiable secret
sharing techniques. Upon receiving k valid replies, the
Figure 3 Advantages of clustering in DCA.
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requesting node adds them together and generates a
proper signature. Unfortunately, the OLSR protocol
does not support any security mechanism and attackers
can alter control packets or send incorrect control pack-
ets. Also attacker may broadcast HELLO messages spe-
cifying neighbors that do not exist and becomes an
MPR or he may send TC messages to be MPR and
launch black hole attacks. To solve these problems, they
use encryption and digital signatures to ensure the
integrity and authenticity of the HELLO and TC
messages.
Another OLSR-based scheme is proposed by Xia et al.
[12]. They use identity-based encryption and alter the
OLSR’s HELLO and TC messages for sending the con-
trol data. However, there are two problems for imple-
menting identity-based FDCA in MANET, the
distributed generation of master keys and distribution of
private keys. To solve these problems, they propose to
distribute the master key share with threshold secret
sharing and use of identity-based signcryption mechan-
ism to provide a security channel for distributed private
key generation.
In addition, because the identity-based encryption can
reduce the communication overhead and resource con-
sumption, the proposed approach is more suitable to
the characteristics of the MANET.
Previous schemes were based on proactive routing, Yi
and Kravets [7] present a PDCA scheme that uses reac-
tive routing and call it MObile CA (MOCA). Any client
who needs a certificate must contact at least k MOCAs.
The contacted MOCAs generate a partial signature over
the received data and client collects at least k partial sig-
natures to construct the full signature. They also pro-
pose a protocol called MOCA certification protocol
(MP), to provide an efficient way for communication
between clients and MOCA nodes. If too few CREP
packets are received, the client timeout and the
certification request fail. So, setting the right value for
this timer is very important. As a CREQ packet passes
through a node, a reverse path to the sender is estab-
lished. These reverse paths are coupled with timers and
maintained long enough for a returning CREP packet to
be able to travel back to the sender. The simplest
method to reach MOCAs is the flooding of CREQ pack-
ets. To reduce the overhead of flooding, they introduce
B-unicast, where the client can use multiple unicast to
replace flooding of CREQs. It utilizes the existing infor-
mation in the route cache and just uses flooding when
there are not enough routes cached. If the network has
low mobility, having just k cached routes may be suffi-
cient. But, in highly mobile networks, sending exactly k
unicast CREQs is dangerous since one CREQ loss
results in the failure of certification request. Therefore,
the node should send additional CREQs. Setting the
right amount of these messages depends on the mobility
of network. There are schemes that are based on
MOCA and try to extend its functionality. For example,
Sen et al. [13] designed a MOCA-based scheme and
developed a reliable protocol with less communication
overhead compared to the original MOCA. Their proto-
col uses the CREQ and CREP messages that can be pig-
gybacked on the routing packets for reducing the
communication overhead. The revocation of certificates
is another issue that has been considered in this scheme.
It is only possible when at least k CA nodes put their
partial signatures on it. Each of the k CA nodes broad-
casts the certificate to be revoked after putting its own
signature. When the certificate to be revoked gathers k -
1 such partial signatures and reaches another CA node,
it completes the signature, revokes the certificate, and
broadcasts the revoked certificate to other CA nodes for
updating their local CRLs. Network partitioning is one
of the major problems that DCA scheme has to deal
with it, in this scheme, it is handled by the transitive
Table 4 Properties of cluster based DCA schemes
Ref
#
Node type Authentication Certificate
storage
Security Other capabilities
[6] Assume users have
been authenticated
Sequential share update CA node discovery by CHs
[2] Cluster members & CHs Evicting a CH, refreshing CH
shares
Support for joining a new CH
[8] Clients, repositories, server
nodes
By fixed RA Clusters repository
nodes
Certificate revocation by CRLs













perform the whole process







Elliptic curve, CRLs, secure
communication between
clusters
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delegation of CA responsibilities. Thus, an ordinary
node that has recently authenticated itself by communi-
cating with k CA nodes will be temporarily deputed to
act as a CA node until the partition problem gets over.
In Table 5, we have specified the important properties
of routing-based DCA schemes so it gives us appropri-
ate details about these schemes.
4.3. Self-initialized schemes
In MANETs, it is very important that DCA schemes be
self-initialized and the system authority exists only at the
beginning of the network startup. So, a number of
schemes have been proposed that support this property,
for example, Ge and Lam [14] present a self-initialized
DCA or SDCA that combine the advantages of the DCA
and certificate chain schemes. They claim that this
scheme addresses the scalability of certificate chain and
has low cost, high availability, and security. In this
scheme, the participating nodes initialize CA with the
self-initializing protocol (SIP). With this protocol, the
fundamental parameters of the DCA, such as the total
number of DCA members, threshold value, and list of
DCA members, will be negotiated and agreed among a
certain number of nodes. With these parameters, the
DCA is then constructed collaboratively by the involving
nodes and without a trusted dealer. Another scheme for
self-initialized DCA in ad hoc network is introduced by
Kang et al. [15]. Their scheme uses proxy and threshold
signatures. In this scheme, chair nodes that can distribute
partial proxy keys for proxy nodes are authenticated by
the system authority. In addition, proxy nodes that can
issue certificates for other nodes are authenticated and
initialized by the system authority or the chair nodes.
4.4. Mobility aware schemes
The mobility of DCA nodes in MANET has direct
impact on DCA operations. If we do not find k DCA
node, the certificate cannot be created. In Figure 4, we
have classified different kinds of mobility that DCA
nodes can show.
Pereira et al. [16] propose a self-adaptable and intru-
sion tolerant CA, that is able to manage changes in the
membership of the servers group and allows the CA to
reconfigure itself for guaranteeing the availability and
the inviolability of the certification service.
Another solution is to increase the number of shares
per node. Joshi et al. [4] have used this approach and
proposed a secure, redundant, and fully distributed key
management scheme for MANET. As a result, the num-
ber of nodes required to recreate the CA key is reduced
and the probability of creating the certificate for normal
users increases. System decreases and an attacker may
compromises the CA key. Therefore, to increase secur-
ity, intrusion detection systems must be used for identi-
fying and removing the misbehaving or compromising
nodes and the q shares chosen at random.
Luo et al. [17] proposed a solution called DIstributed
CerTification Authority with probabilisTic freshness
(DICTATE). They tried to enhance the security of an ad
hoc network under the responsibility of a mother certifi-
cation authority (mCA). Since the nodes can frequently
be isolated from the mCA there is still a need to access
to a certification authority. The mCA preassigns a spe-
cial role to several nodes called servers that constitute a
distributed certification authority during the isolated
period. This solution ensures that the DCA always pro-
cesses a certificate update or query request in a finite
amount of time and that an adversary cannot forge a
certificate. Moreover, it guarantees that the DCA
responds to a query request with the most recent ver-
sion of the queried certificate in a certain probability;





Optimization Security Other capabilities
[5] OLSR Use TC and Hello messages Encryption and digital signatures to protect TC
& Hello messages
Choosing DCA server nodes
based on hop counts




MP or MOCA Certification protocol, B-
unicast to replace flooding
Utilize route cache information, creating
reverse path in CREQ forwarding
[13] Reactive routing
protocols
Piggybacking of CREQ & CREP on the
routing packets
CRLs maintenance and deployment Handle network partitioning
Figure 4 Different kinds of node mobility in DCA systems.
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this probability can be made arbitrarily close to one, but
at the expense of higher overhead.
4.5. Security-based schemes
Some of the presented schemes for DCA try to improve
DCA’s security and guard it against various attacks. For
example, Zhou et al. [18] have designed a scheme called
multiple-key cryptography-based DCA (MC-DCA)
which is resilient to Sybil attacks. It achieves lower com-
munication overhead and moderate latency compared
with the threshold-based schemes. The Sybil attack is
fatal to the threshold scheme. There is no efficient way
to defeat it. In MANET, attackers can forge the IP and
hardware addresses easily, so a malicious node imperso-
nates many identities and it is difficult to bind a single
identity with one node.
Also, Rajaram and Palaniswami [19] designed a high
performance CA that supports certificate renewal, revo-
cation, and resists to various outside attacks. Their
scheme supports routing cum forwarding (RCF) of
packet monitoring, certification revival, and certificate
revocation. By monitoring RCF behavior, the malicious
nodes are detected by monitoring the behavior hop-by-
hop. Certificate revival uses a redundancy scheme in
which a node is allocated more than one key share by
incorporating redundancy into the network. This
mechanism guarantees that genuine nodes can continue
to stay in the network by revival of their certificates
along a periodical time period. Certificate revocation
provides the authority to isolate any malicious nodes or
regain the nodes which turn up to its best state after
any attack or failure.
In Figure 5, we have specified the security techniques
that can be applied in DCA systems. It is obvious that
none of these methods can provide security and we
must apply all of them to provide a secure DCA
scheme.
4.5. Performance- and availability-based schemes
In general, when we distribute the task of one system to
many subsystems, we may have availability and perfor-
mance problems. So, some of the DCA schemes try to
decrease these problems and use special infrastructures
to provide better availability and performance. For
example, Raghani et al. [20] have designed a DCA, in
which networks nodes can obtain certificate from their
one hop neighbors. With such distributed CA, when the
number of neighbors of a node, also called node degree,
reduces, there is a substantial increase in the certifica-
tion service delays. Therefore, they have tried to solve
this problem with a suite of network monitoring proto-
cols. The proposed protocols dynamically adjust the
threshold value by monitoring the average node degree
of the network and thereby prevent an increase in certi-
fication service delay.
We have compared the properties of various proposed
DCA schemes at Table 3. This comparison gives us
good insight on the proposed schemes and determines
the less researched areas that can be studied in future
works.
5. Design goals
Chaddoud et al. [2] have proposed some properties for
DCA systems in MANETs. We complete these proper-
ties by adding important issues, which are required for
MANET environments:
•Availability
Like the normal user nodes, the DCA shareholding
nodes may move to the other places and be inacces-
sible to the user nodes. In this condition, a user
node may not find the required k DCA server node.
Thus, a DCA scheme must take into account the
mobility of DCA server nodes and dynamic nature
of a MANET and propose appropriate solutions to
solve these problems. For example, in some schemes,
this problem is solved by allocating more than one
share to each DCA server node.
• Security
To avoid the single point of failure, no important
system secret must be allocated to a single node and
DCA key pairs must be generated in a distributed
way. Also, a key refresh protocol is required to
ensure that the lifetimes of critical keys are
restricted. In addition, intra DCA data must be
secured with encryption or digital signatures.
Figure 5 Techniques for providing security in DCA systems.
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• Reliability
DCA system should avoid relying solely on the
underlying communication network, since channels
or nodes may be compromised. Where possible, mea-
sures should be taken to improve system robustness.
Use of encryption and digital signature for inter DCA
node communication can improve DCA’s security.
• Efficiency
MANET nodes are power and bandwidth limited
and communication is relatively slow and unreliable,
so protocols should attempt to minimize the amount
of transmitted data between nodes.
• Fault tolerance
The main concern of fault tolerance is the capability
to maintain correct operation in the presence of
faulty nodes. If a node is malfunctioning and other
nodes can observe such malfunctions, a certain level
of recovery is possible. For example, some schemes
such as MOCA employ intelligent replication using
threshold cryptography to provide tolerance of faulty
nodes.
• User node mobility
DCA system must support two kinds of mobility in
MANET, first client nodes mobility, and second
DCA server nodes mobility. In first case, client
nodes may change their position or travel other clus-
ters, so it is desirable that user can use the DCA sys-
tem even in the destination cluster or position. Also,
we can consider two kind of client nodes mobility,
nodes mobility inside the nodes administrative
domain and between the administrative domains.
• Self-initialization
It is better that schemes work in a self-initialized
manner where the system authority exists only at the
beginning of the network operation, or system work
by itself without any administrative interventions.
• Conformance to network properties
A DCA system is a layer above the ad hoc network. It
uses MANET services to process user requests. Thus,
it will be more cost-effective that DCA system uses
the existing protocols and infrastructures efficiently.
For example, if the clustering has been used in
MANET, it is better to use it, or if MANET uses
some proactive routing protocol, it is better to use its
control packets for piggybacking required data.
• Conformance to network size
The type of DCA system used depends on the
MANET size. So, with few numbers of nodes we can
use FDCA schemes and with the large number of
nodes, PDCA schemes can be used.
• Integration
A DCA system is not a standalone system. It must
cooperate with the other security components and
should be easily integrated with the other systems
such as registration authorities or user applications.
This can be achieved by using standard algorithms
and methods in all security programs. For example,
certificate and CRLs must be according to the X.509
standards.
• Scalability
It is normal that the performance of the DCA sys-
tem decrease with the expansion and growth of
Figure 6 The reasons of certificate revocation.
Figure 7 Different levels of Independence in DCA schemes.
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network. So, the collection of shareholding nodes
must be proportional to the number of normal
nodes over the time. Thus, we require protocols to
enable shareholding DCA nodes to leave and join
the DCA system.
• Certificate revocation and validation
It is better that DCA not only supports operations
such as issuing and management of certificates,
but also supports revocation and validation of
issued certificates. These operations are done using
CRLs or OCSP protocol. Figure 6 shows the com-
ponents and reasons that indicate why the certifi-
cates can be revoked. As one can see from this
figure, unlike Internet, MANET members can
accuse other nodes and revoke the certificate of
malicious nodes.
• Independence
A DCA system like the other distributed systems
should not depend on central components. It must
be designed and built without any reliance on any
components of fixed or wired networks. Figure 7
shows different levels of independence in DCA
schemes: fully independent, semi-dependent, and
fully dependent DCA schemes.
Semi-dependent schemes depend on the other
MANET components and services. But, fully dependent
schemes depend on the wired networks components
such as RAs or CAs.
• Low storage overhead
A PKI system requires large amount of storage for
storing its certificate, keys, and other data structures.
Although this property of PKI is not very important on
Internet, it can create some problems in resource lim-
ited networks including MANETs. Therefore, an ideal
DCA system must have low storage overhead and do
not waste limited storages of mobile devices. In Figure
Figure 8 Required storages for implementing PKI.
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8, we have shown various information that a DCA
scheme should store in a DCA client node.
Although, it is desirable that an ideal DCA has all
these properties, some of them are in contradict to each
other. For example, to support DCA nodes mobility,
some schemes allocate more than one share to each
DCA server node, so achieve mobility with the cost of
decreased security. The properties of 18 DCA schemes
proposed for MANETs have been compared in Table 6.
6. Conclusion and future works
Security of MANET is one of the challenging issues.
Many schemes have been proposed to increase the
security of this kind of networks. PKI has provided
many security services in wired and fixed networks; so
many schemes try to adapt PKI components such as
CAs to special characteristics of MANETs. In this arti-
cle, we classified various DCA schemes and investigated
pros and cons of them. This classification can help us to
better understand the applied techniques in DCA sys-
tems and propose more appropriate solutions or
upgrade existing ones. Also, it shows us that the areas
that are less investigated or properties that are less sup-
ported. For example, although the communication pat-
tern in DCA is one-to-many but none of the studied
solutions have used multicast routing, or with the
greater need on security none of the schemes have used
secure routing protocols. Thus, many aspects of DCA
systems must be investigated and evaluated to achieve
better performance, scalability, and security.
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